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Abstract—The two most spread network anomalies are port
and net scan. In this work, we present and analyze the results
obtained by traditional approaches on Apache Spark. The use of
Big Data technologies grants to significantly reduce the execution
times of the algorithm, so to be used even in current high-
speed networks. The paper describes our approach and presents
an experimental analysis in terms of detection performance
and execution time. We use real traffic traces from MAWI
archive and MAWILab anomaly detectors to compare with our
results. The analysis shows that i) our traditional threshold-based
algorithm is already able to achieve detection performance higher
than MAWILab (in 95% of the considered cases with the best
threshold value), currently considered the gold standard in the
field; ii) the execution time is much shorter than the trace time,
which makes it usable also in real time. Moreover, we bridge an
important gap in literature providing the research community
with a new labeled dataset, validated using MAWILab and
extended with other anomalies not detected by it.
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
The pervasive use of the Internet has led to a significant
increase in the amount of traffic that crosses the network every
day, so the amount of data that an anomaly detector has to
analyze is higher and higher, especially in current high-speed
networks. Network traffic can be analyzed at several layers of
the protocol stack: packet, flow, application, etc. At flow-level,
packets relating to the same TCP or UDP communication
(e.g. all packets related to an HTTP communication from
and to a single host and a web server) are aggregated, and
a summary of such group of packets is considered. These
summaries can now be provided directly by network devices
such as switches and routers, and standard protocols have been
defined for this aim (e.g. Internet Protocol Flow Information
Export or IPFIX [1]). Working at flow level seems the most
promising approach for coping with the high-speed of current
and future networks. However, even at the flow-level, the
detection of anomalies in high-speed networks require huge
computational power or data reduction techniques as flow
records represent a huge quantity of data.
In this paper, we analyze traffic traces from high-speed
networks using a flow-level approach. The aim is to detect
two of the most spread network anomalies i.e. port scan and
network scan (or simply net scan). In the former case, an
attacker probes a host (the victim) on various TCP/UDP ports
to find active and vulnerable services. In the latter case, the
attacker scans a group of victim hosts on a single or a small
number of ports. Such scanning activities are also associated
with worms and botnets [2].
Port and net scans generate a real specific pattern in network
traffic. One of the most popular methods for detecting scanning
activity is based on the fan-in fan-out proportion of the hosts,
i.e. counting the number of incoming and outgoing flows,
and comparing their ratio with a threshold [3], [4]. With this
approach, the performance in terms of detection capacity can
be high, but the performance in terms of execution times can
be very low [3]–[5]. Sampling is typically applied to solve
this problem, but this involves a significant loss of information.
To overcome this problem, we have used Big Data analysis
techniques to analyze a large amount of data with a threshold-
based algorithm in the shortest possible time. In particular,
we use the Apache Spark framework (Spark in the following),
which is comparable to Hadoop Map/Reduce but it provides
faster results working entirely in the memory. We implemented
a simple threshold-based detection algorithm in Spark and
tested it by using several real traces. Our results in terms of
execution time show that we achieve a processing rate up to
1/16 of the trace duration, which makes the approach able to
run in real time. Comparing our detection performance with
MAWILab 1, we show that our approach achieves fewer false
negatives than MAWILab which is to say that we can uncover
more anomalies than the gold standard.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows: i) we show
that the threshold-based approach can achieve higher detection
performance than the available gold standard based on much
more complex and therefore less observable approaches; ii)
we show that threshold-based approaches can be applied to
current network traffic using Big Data technologies to achieve
the required processing speed; iii) we provide an improved and
constantly updated dataset which can be used by the research
community for further studies on this important topic. The
new dataset is automatically released on our SPADA project
website http://spada.comics.unina.it.
We believe this represents an important step forward for the
research community focused on port and net scans.
A. Scanning Activities over Time
Our first question in this work was if net and port scan
anomalies are still actual today, so to justify further studies
on this topic. To answer this question, we have conducted a
longitudinal analysis of the number of anomalies detected by
MAWILab over time.Fig. 1 shows the box plot of the scanning
anomalies related to the years from 2007 to 2017The image
presents a growing trend, with a large increase in the ratio
starting from 2014. This result indicates that the scanning
1Mawilab Documentation: http://www.fukuda-lab.org/mawilab/
documentation
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anomalies are increasingly present in the traces: an increase
that has been evident especially in recent years. This behavior
motivates our choice to focus on these types of the anomaly
and calls the research community for always updated data,
techniques, and tools for port and net scan detection.
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Fig. 1. Ratio of scanning over all anomalous activities over time during the
last 11 years.
II. STATE OF THE ART
Scientific literature has been focusing on network and
port scan for several years. Generally, these anomalies are
examined considering that a source of scanning activity shows
a very high number of outgoing connections [5]. Zhao et
al. [3] also proposed an approach based on this consid-
erationTo cope with high connection speeds (10-40 Gb/s),
they proposed a standard hash-based flow sampling algorithm.
Dainotti et al. [6] used wavelet to detect network anomalies
and to precisely locate their position inside the traffic, while
Balram et al. [7] proposed a technique based on packet count
through neural networks. Sridharan et al. [8] compared the
performance of Snort and Bro on backbone traffic and propose
a new approach based on sequential hypothesis testing that
achieves higher performance than existing ones. Kim et al. [4]
described a scanning activity in terms of traffic models. Traffic
is analyzed at flow-level, but the scanning anomalies are
detected by analysis of variations in network traffic models.
Chan et al. [9] proposed two machine learning methods, useful
for the constructing of models detecting network anomalies
starting from past behavior. The approach described by Wagner
et al. [10] is based on probabilistic measurement of entropy,
used to indicate regularity in traffic of network flows. Traffic
models used in the three last works can be sensitive to changes
in the type of traffic and network. Threshold-based approaches
have been widely and successfully used in the literature [11].
In this work, we want to update these approaches to the current
transmission rates and network technologies, and without
linking the analysis to a specific point of the network.
MAWILab team proposed a system to detect attacks or
anomalous events, applying a combination of four detectors
with different theoretical backgrounds IV-A. This system is
currently used as a gold standard in literature [12]: Casas
et al. proposed the combined use of a Big Data framework
and machine learning algorithms to achieve high performance
in terms of speed of execution and detection performance.
They analyzed five types of anomalies. We focus on the
entire class of port and net scan and use a much simpler
detection algorithm. Moreover, we uncover that MAWILab -
the ground truth they, as many other works in literature, use -
is incomplete. This clearly jeopardizes the results obtained.
Therefore, we also propose an improved dataset, obtained
through a combination of MAWILab and our algorithm.
III. OUR APPROACH
A. A simple detection algorithm
The algorithm used in this paper for port and net scan
detection is described below. Input data are flow-level infor-
mation, where, in particular, we mainly concentrate on the
timestamp, the IP addresses and the transport-layer ports of
each flow. For our experiments, we obtained the flow-level
information processing the packet traces from MAWI with a
tool named TIE (Traffic Identification Engine) 2. This tool
combines the packets in flows using five fields: Source IP
Address, Destination IP Address, Source Port, Destination
Port, Protocol. Then, our algorithm divides the flow-level trace
into time intervals, denominated slices, of custom duration
(e.g. 30 seconds). Afterward, we use Spark SQL to calculate
the proportion between generated and received flows in each
slice and from each IP address. Then, this proportion is
compared with a threshold value. The IPs whose proportion
is larger than the threshold are marked as anomalous.
It is worth noting that, even if it is very simple, this
algorithm is still quite robust. For instance, it does not mark
as anomalous hosts those generate a large amount of, even
unbalanced, flows (e.g. servers serving popular applications)
because a few responses from the other hosts (e.g. the clients)
is sufficient to re-balance the equation. As we will see in
Sec. IV-B, this simple algorithm is able to detect port and
net scan anomalies with high precision and recall and in very
short execution time if run on Apache Spark. It is also worth
specifying that this algorithm cannot detect other types of
anomalies or more sophisticated attacks by design, but it does
not require traffic sampling or modeling. Moreover, it is able
to detect all types of port and net scans unlike other works
that focus only on specific types such as [12] that analyzes
only UDP and TCP-ACK net scan. This algorithm is useful
to show how the Big Data Analytics framework can solve
long-unresolved issues in this important field of research. In
fact, this algorithm, implemented on Apache Spark, achieves
the high performance needed for detecting anomalies in large
volumes of traffic, not recurring to a complex technique.
B. Using Apache Spark
Apache Spark is a platform for fast and efficient distributed
processing of Big Data which has almost substituted Hadoop
2Traffic Identification Engine http://tie.comics.unina.it
3. It is very fast both in storage and in data processing because
it supports in-memory processing, which allows analyzing data
directly in main memory [13].
Apache Spark can work in two different ways: Batch and
Streaming. Both modes 4 have been used in this work. Apache
Spark allows data storage in three different types of structure:
Resilient Distributed Dataset (RDD), Dataframe, and Dataset.
In this work, the DataFrame structure is used: it is conceptually
equivalent to a table in a relational databaseOn these types
of tables, it is possible to execute SQL queries using SQL
commands, whose results are still a DataFrame. Apache Spark
supports different programming languages, e.g. Java, Python,
and Scala. We used Scala for two main reasons: i) Apache
Spark is built on Scala and so if there are errors in the code
or the source code does not have the expected result it is
easier to debug; ii) Scala is about 10 times faster than others
(Python) to analyze and to process data by the presence of the
Java Virtual Machine.
IV. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
A. Data used
We used several real traffic traces from the MAWI (Mea-
surement and Analysis of the Wide Internet) dataset: an
archive of real traffic traces provided by the MAWI Working
Group 5. Traces are captured since 2007, and they constitute
a very rich dataset that includes different applications and
network conditions, including the presence of various known
anomalies with global or local impact, periods of congestion,
and network reconfiguration. Traffic traces considered are
captured on a transoceanic link that connects Japan and the
United States of America. Each trace in the archive consists
of traffic captured every day from 14:00 to 14:15 in different
locations inside the WIDE network. Traces of 24 and 48 hours
are also occasionally collected. A typical 15-minute trace is
characterized by anonymized IP addresses, without payload,
and contains 300k-500k unique IP addresses [14]. In this work,
we use the traces captured at Samplepoint-F, a link working
at 1 Gbps with a current average load of 650 Mbps that has
largely increased in recent years [15].
The MAWI group also created the MAWILab project,
including a novel approach for the network anomaly detection,
applied automatically every day on traffic from a specific
MAWI repository. MAWILab defines a distance to normal
traffic to recognize anomalies in MAWI traffic traces. This
distance depends on the combination of four anomaly detectors
based on different theoretical backgrounds: Principal Compo-
nent Analysis (PCA), Gamma distribution, Kullback Leibler
(KL) divergence, and Hough transformation. These detectors
only work on the IP header [16], [17]. The results of these
detectors are combined to classify the anomalies in four types:
Anomalous - assigned to all abnormal traffic and should be
identified by any efficient anomaly detector, according to the
3Welcome to Apache Hadoop! https://hadoop.apache.org
4Spark Streaming - Spark 2.3.0 Documentation. https://spark.apache.org/
docs/latest/streaming-programming-guide.html
5Mawi working group traffic archive. http://mawi.nezu.wide.ad.jp/mawi/
authors; Suspicious - assigned to all traffic that is probably
anomalous but not clearly identified by their method; Notice
- assigned to all traffic that is not anomalous, but has been
reported by at least one detector; Benign - all the rest of the
traffic where no detector has labeled it as abnormal.
MAWILab provides the results of the analysis in two files,
Anomalous and Notice, in which there are all the anomalies
found. After detecting the anomalous behaviors, MAWILab
applies a heuristic to assign a label related to the type
of anomaly. Possible labels are represented in a tree-based
taxonomy, where the root is a generic event and nodes contain
an anomaly label. In the first part of this work, we used
MAWILab archive as a ground truth [18] to validate our
method (Sec. IV-B). Successively, we verified that many
anomalies were not detected by MAWILab, and built a new
dataset on which we performed further analysis (Sec. V-B).
It is worth noting that MAWILab database helped and still
helps a lot of researchers to evaluate the performance of novel
anomaly detectors. The availability of traffic traces is already
scarce. Labeled traces, including an indication of anomalies
inside them, are very very rare in our research community, and
this is a great obstacle to further studies on this topic. For this
reason, we decided to also evaluate MAWILab accuracy, and
we finally managed to improve it. In particular, our dataset [19]
includes a larger set of port and net scans not detected by
MAWILab, which we believe is an important contribution for
the research community.
B. Methodology
The execution of the anomaly detection algorithm, described
in Sec. III-A, provides in output the IP addresses that are
sources of port or net scans. In the first part of our experi-
mentation, we have used MAWILab as ground truth, i.e. we
compared the addresses, detected by our algorithm, with the
ones in the anomalous and notice files provided by MAWILab.
The IP addresses detected by our algorithm are also in one of
these two files are considered true positives. The results of
this analysis are reported in Sec. V-A. We considered as false
positives the ones detected by us and not by MAWILab and
false negatives the ones detected by MAWILab and not by us.
For true and false positives we manually verified that all the
IP addresses reported are actually anomalous. Such analysis
evidenced the limitations of MAWILab: several anomalies we
detected were not present in both MAWILab files (i.e. were
even not considered suspicious by MAWILab). As explained
in details in Sec. V-B, we confirmed this result with several
manual inspections of the pcap files. Starting from this impor-
tant result, we constructed a new dataset extending MAWILab
with other anomalous flows and used such dataset as a ground
truth for another experimental analysis, reported in Sec. V-B.
A confusion matrix is generated comparing the results of the
threshold-based algorithm and the ones from MAWILab. The
detection performance of our anomaly detector is evaluated
using two main metrics: Recall, also called True Positive Rate,
and Precision.
Fig. 2. Recall (left) and Precision (right) of the threshold-based approach
using MAWILab as ground truth.
Several traffic traces have been analyzed in our
experimentation. Results reported in the following refer
to 60 traces, characterized by a duration of 15 minutes
and collected from December 2017 to September 2018.
Similar results have been obtained on the other traces. We
have carried out multiple tests on different values of the
threshold ranging from 20 to 200. A sensitivity analysis for
this important parameter is reported in Sec. V-C. Most of the
following results are then presented for the three threshold
values that are more interesting: 50, 100, 200.
V. RESULTS OF THE EXPERIMENTS
A. Using MAWILab as a ground truth
In this section, we analyze the results we obtained using
MAWILab as a ground truth. In particular, we used the
Anomalous and Notice files from MAWILab and considered
only scanning anomalies, which are the ones our detector
has been designed for. All anomalies that are not part of
scanning activities have been removed from MAWILab results
(e.g. normal events, Denial of Services, Distributed Denial of
Services). Since the aggregation of packets into flows does not
work well for ICMP, due to unbalanced reduction compared
to TCP/UDP, ICMP anomalies are not considered. Fig. 2
shows the values of the Recall and Precision obtained. In
particular, we report the box plot of the precision and recall
obtained for all the traces considered. Such figures illustrate
the median value of the recall ranges from about 0.65 to about
0.4 increasing the threshold value. The median value of the
precision ranges from 0.3 to 0.65 increasing the threshold
value. Using a threshold value of 100 we can obtain about 0.55
for the recall and about 0.5 for the precision. These results
may seem to indicate that a threshold-based approach does
not allow to obtain satisfactory results and cannot be used to
detect such anomalies. We then analyzed the false positives in
more details to validate this hypothesis.
We performed manual inspection of the pcap trace starting
from the false positives. Such inspection revealed that the
most part of the false positives was actually a source of
scanning activity and MAWILab was unable to detect them.
For example, we noticed that several IP addresses generate
flows with one or two packets, mostly with the TCP SYN
and ACK flags set, and they receive zero or a very small
number of answers. In addition, the number of useful bytes, i.e.
bytes of the TCP payload, is usually zero. These considerations
have led to consider them as IP addresses generating port and
net scan. We confirmed this result using several traces. An
important implication of this result is that we can not consider
MAWILab as a ground truth as done up to now in different
works in literature.
B. Constructing and using the new ground truth
We built a new dataset expanding MAWILab with the IP
addresses that have been found abnormal. In particular, based
on the results of the previous analysis, we implemented two
heuristic rules to complement MAWILab results for all the
cases in which a source of the scanning activity was not
detected by MAWILab. IP addresses that are false positives
and trigger such rules are reintegrated into the true positives.
The rules are the following: i) An IP address is a generator of
Net Scan if it generates at least 20 flows towards different IPs
of the same subnet; ii) An IP address is a generator of Port
Scan if it contacts the same destination IP address on more
than 10 ports. Using these rules on several traces, we have built
a new dataset to evaluate the performance of the threshold-
based algorithm detector. This new dataset is obtained by the
union of MAWILab results and the list of IP addresses that are
considered a source of scanning activities after the application
of the rules implemented.
Fig. 3. Difference between the Recall of the threshold-based approach and
the one of MAWILab using the new dataset as ground truth.
In the experiments described in the following, we compared
MAWILab with the threshold-based approach and used the
new dataset as a ground truth. Fig. 3 shows the difference
between the recall of the threshold-based algorithm and the
one of MAWILab as a function of the different traces analyzed.
The figure shows that the recall of the former algorithm is
larger than the one of MAWILab in 95% of the cases when
the threshold value is 50 and in 33% of the case with a
threshold value of 100. When we increase the threshold value,
MAWILab starts to obtain better performance in terms of
Recall.
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Fig. 4. Recall (a) and Precision (b) of the threshold-based approach using
the new dataset as ground truth.
The values of recall for the threshold-based algorithm are
reported in Fig. 4 (a). The precision of MAWILab is clearly
equal to 1 because there are not false positives.Fig. 4 (b)
shows the precision of the threshold-based algorithm. We
can see that for the intermediate threshold value (i.e. 100)
the precision is larger than 0.85 in about 70% of the cases,
and the median value is about 0.88. Higher precision values
can be obtained with higher threshold values. Comparing the
results in Fig. 2 and Fig. 4 we can see the improvement
of the performance of the threshold-based approach with the
new dataset. Moreover, we can say that such very simple
approach allows obtaining very high performance, higher than
MAWILab which uses a much more complicated and therefore
less observable approach. Summarizing, in this section we
have shown that very simple detection algorithm can obtain
an even better Recall than MAWILab (in 95% of the cases
with a threshold 50 and in 33% of the cases with a threshold
100), and this is because MAWILAb is not able to detect all
scanning activities in MAWI traffic traces.
C. Analysis of sensitivity to the threshold
Fig. 5 shows the average values of recall and precision
obtained for several threshold values ranging from 20 to 200
using the new dataset as a ground truth. This figure shows that
the best threshold value depends on which metric you want to
maximize. For example, if false positives are annoying for a
human intervention in the security pipeline, a good threshold
value is about 125. For such value, an average precision of
about 0.9 can be obtained. On the other side, if false negatives
are more a problem, 50 is the best threshold value to have
a high recall without losing too much precision. An optimal
value for both metrics is 80, which allows obtaining an average
recall and precision of about 0.85.
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Fig. 5. Average Recall (blue) and Precision (red) using the new dataset as
ground truth for several threshold values.
D. Speed analysis
In this section, we report the results of the analysis of
execution times of the threshold-based algorithm. Longer
traffic traces, with a duration of 24 hours, have been taken
from MAWI Dataset and used for this analysis. Spark was used
on virtual machines with different characteristics, all running
on a private cloud. In particular, we have instantiated a master
machine with 8 GB of RAM and 4 cores and different worker
instances:
• First Configuration: A machine with 32Gb of RAM and
4 cores.
• Second Configuration: Two machines with 32Gb of
RAM and 4 cores.
• Third Configuration: A machine with 64Gb of RAM
and 8 cores.
Fig. 6 shows the box plot of the execution times related
to the three configurations. The x-axis represents the three
configurations, and the y-axis represents the ratio between
the execution time and the duration of the trace. In the
first configuration, the average execution time is about 1/14
of trace duration. In the second and third configurations,
i.r. more machines and more resources on the single machine
respectively, the execution time is shorter than in the first one.
In addition, there is no particular improvement between the
second and the third configuration.
VI. CONCLUSION
Anomaly detection in network traffic is a hot topic in
scientific literature, and it is in continuous evolution. Many
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Fig. 6. Execution times of the threshold-based approach on Apache Spark in
three different configurations.
proposals have been presented for this important research
problem, but still today these kinds of anomalies are difficult to
be detected efficiently and with high precision. In this research
area, two well known malicious activities are port and net
scans. In this paper we have firstly shown that these anomalies
are still ingreasigly spread in recent years. Several research
efforts are currently put on complex techniques for anomaly
detection, such as deep learning. These techniques can provide
good detection performance [12], but their observability is
limited. Our idea, instead, was to recover traditional detection
approaches and resort to novel computing frameworks for
obtaining the performance required by current network traffic.
In particular, we used a threshold-based algorithm, working
at flow-level. The basic idea of this algorithm is to recognize
malicious hosts looking at the ratio of their fan-in and fan-out
(i.e. the number of outgoing and incoming flows). Though very
simple, this approach can obtain good detection performance,
but it has scarce performance in terms of processing time. To
cope with this problem, exacerbated in high-speed networks,
we used Big Data Analytics and Apache Spark in particular.
We conducted an experimental analysis with several real
traffic traces from the MAWI archive. We also used MAWILab
anomaly detection results as a ground truth in the first part,
and a comparison in the second one, after recognizing that
MAWILab fails to detect several scans. We firstly evaluated
the precision and recall of the threshold-based algorithm using
MAWILab as a ground truth. Results were not satisfactory,
in particular in terms of false positives, and pushed us to
investigate more in deep. Through manual inspections of
several traffic traces, we verified that such positives were
actually true rather than false. This drove us to create a
new dataset starting from MAWILab and complementing it
with several other anomalies identified through heuristic rules
devised thanks to the analyses described above. We then
evaluated the performance of the threshold-based algorithm
using the new dataset as ground truth and compared obtained
results with the ones from MAWILab. This analysis shows that
the simpler algorithm can easily achieve higher recall than
MAWILab, which is already based on much more complex
algorithms.
Moreover, we also have shown that the threshold-based
algorithm presents short execution times, varying between 1/12
and 1/16 of the duration of the trace, thanks to the adoption of
Apache Spark. Finally, we also set up a system that processes
the traces available from MAWI every day and publishes a new
dataset, including a comparison with MAWILab. We believe
this was an important yet missing contribution for further
studies on this research topic.
REFERENCES
[1] J. Quittek, T. Zseby, B. Claise, S. Zander, “RFC3917: Requirements for
IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX),” 2004.
[2] Cliff C. Zou, Don Towsley, and Weibo Gong, “On the performance of
internet worm scanning strategies,” Performance Evaluation, pp. 700 –
723, 2006.
[3] Q. Zhao, J. Xu, and A. Kumar, “Detection of super sources and des-
tinations in high-speed networks: Algorithms, analysis and evaluation,”
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, pp. 1840–1852,
Oct 2006.
[4] Myung-Sup Kim, Hun-Jeong Kong, Seong-Cheol Hong, Seung-Hwa
Chung, and J. W. Hong, “A flow-based method for abnormal network
traffic detection,” in 2004 IEEE/IFIP Network Operations and Manage-
ment Symposium (IEEE Cat. No.04CH37507), vol. 1, April 2004, pp.
599–612 Vol.1.
[5] A. Sperotto, G. Schaffrath, R. Sadre, C. Morariu, A. Pras, and B. Stiller,
“An Overview of IP Flow-Based Intrusion Detection,” IEEE Communi-
cations Surveys Tutorials, pp. 343–356, Third 2010.
[6] A. Dainotti, A. Pescape, and G. Ventre, “Nis04-1: Wavelet-based detec-
tion of dos attacks,” in IEEE Globecom 2006, Nov 2006, pp. 1–6.
[7] S. Balram and M. Wiscy, “Detection of tcp syn scanning using packet
counts and neural network,” in 2008 IEEE International Conference on
Signal Image Technology and Internet Based Systems, Nov 2008, pp.
646–649.
[8] A. Sridharan, T. Ye, and S. Bhattacharyya, “Connectionless port scan
detection on the backbone,” in 2006 IEEE International Performance
Computing and Communications Conference, April 2006, pp. 10 pp.–
576.
[9] Philip K. Chan, Matthew V. Mahoney, and Muhammad H. Arshad,
“Learning rules and clusters for anomaly detection in network traffic,”
MACO, volume 5, July 2005.
[10] A. Wagner and B. Plattner, “Entropy based worm and anomaly detection
in fast ip networks,” in 14th IEEE International WETICE’05, June 2005,
pp. 172–177.
[11] Maciej Korczynski et al, “An accurate sampling scheme for detecting
syn flooding attacks and portscans,” in ICC’11, 2011.
[12] P. Casas, F. Soro, J. Vanerio, G. Settanni, and A. D’Alconzo, “Network
security and anomaly detection with big-dama, a big data analytics
framework,” in 2017 IEEE CloudNet, Sept 2017, pp. 1–7.
[13] A. G. Shoro and T. R. Soomro, “View of big data analysis: Apache
spark perspective,” Global Journals Inc. (USA), 2015.
[14] R. Fontugne, P. Abry, K. Fukuda, D. Veitch, K. Cho, P. Borgnat, and
H. Wendt, “Scaling in internet traffic: A 14 year and 3 day longitudinal
study, with multiscale analyses and random projections,” IEEE/ACM
Transactions on Networking, pp. 2152–2165, Aug 2017.
[15] P. Borgnat, G. Dewaele, K. Fukuda, P. Abry, and K. Cho, “Seven
years and one day: Sketching the evolution of internet traffic,” in IEEE
INFOCOM 2009, April 2009, pp. 711–719.
[16] J. Mazel, R. Fontugne, and K. Fukuda, “A taxonomy of anomalies in
backbone network traffic,” in IWCMC 2014, Aug 2014, pp. 30–36.
[17] R. Fontugne, P. Borgnat, P. Abry, and K. Fukuda, “Mawilab: Com-
bining diverse anomaly detectors for automated anomaly labeling and
performance benchmarking,” in Proceedings of the 6th International
Conference. New York, USA: ACM Conext 2010, 2010.
[18] Jurgen A H R Claassen, “The gold standard: not a golden standard,”
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC557893/, August 2018.
[19] “The spada research project,” spada.comics.unina.it, March 2019.
